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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
This thesis presents methods for securing a facility that has wireless connectivity. When 
using a hardwired network, an intruder needs physical access to the wire. The problem with 
wireless networks is that the physical layer is a very large area. The RF signals travel 
through the air. This makes it easier for an attacker to intercept packets being sent to 
_wireless stations. With RF signals bouncing off of solid objects and traveling through the air, 
it makes eavesdropping easier. Another issue with wireless technology is spoofing. : Within a 
given distance an attacker can spoof wireless signals and possibly j am the legitimate signals. 
An example of this deals with the IEEE 802.11 wireless standard. The RF` signals: are 
sent over the 2.4 GHz frequency range. This means the signals can travel a few hundred feet 
within buildings from its source. The 802.11 standard does use spread spectrum technology, 
because the FCC specified the use of this technology to minimize mutual interference for all 
the services that will use the band. Spread spectrum is designed to make it :harder .to detect 
and intercept the signals and less susceptible to interference. Since IEEE 802.11 is able to 
travel a distance from the base, it makes the physical limits hard to secure. This helps an 
attacker if they wanted to intercept signals. The IEEE 802.11 standard does not provide 
adequate defense against jamming attacks from an outside source. 
The goal is to prevent position location of cellular phones and other wireless devices 
within the secure facility. When going to a secure facility, devices like cell phones are 
usually restricted, for fear of cell phone tracking by unfriendly sources. Even if a cell phone 
is not in use it will still send out signals through attempts to connect to a base station. With 
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this knowledge, a person would have the ability to track a cell phone inside of a secure area. 
However, not all cell phones have to connect to a base station in order to connect. Direct 
connect, a technology that negates the need for a base station by allowing cellular phones to 
connect directly with one another, is offered by many cellular services. 
This thesis will focus on securing a facility that uses wireless devices. The systems of 
focus are the IEEE 802.1 1, Code Division Multiple Access (COMA) and Global system for 
mobile communication (GSM)_. The forms of spread spectrum technology are direct 
sequence and frequency hopping spread spectrum. 
1.2 Research Overview 
The goal of this research is to develop a solution to securing a facility that utilizes 
wireless communications. The research will introduce methods to track and lo~c.ate the : . . 
position of attackers. This research also introduces the idea of using a Honeynet system for 
added security. The idea of a Honeynet is not new. Honeynet is being adapted to~ this 
research as a potential defense solution. This research uses what is called Defense-In- 
Depth. 
Defense- in-depth is when multiple layers of security are used. Amore complete 
description of defense-in-depth is in the section Defense-In-Depth. The first of the layers is 
the Zone of Interference. This Zone is an area where jammer transmitters and directive 
antennas are set up to take advantage of the near far-effect. The near-far-effect will be 
explained in a later technical section (section 4.3). The idea is to use the near-far-effect to 
give a stronger signal on the perimeter of the secure area, to mask any signals escaping from 
the secure area. 
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This Zone uses directive Yagi antenna arrays to direct the radiation. There are 
.multiple jamming methods that are utilized within this Zone. The transmitters are designed 
to flood the specified frequency range. The j ammer design is then set to do what is called a 
smart jammer. This is done for frequency hopping spread spectrum. Amore complete 
description is given in the section on jamming process. 
-The next layer of security is the Honeynet Zone. The idea behind a Honeynet is 
nothing new, but the idea is being adapted to fit this wireless communication security 
research. The idea is to make an attacker believe that they are seeing real network traffic. 
-This is done at the Honeynet Zone once a device has been determined to be unfriendly.. . . 
Decoy mobile devices are first placed within the Honeynet Zone. Spoofed traffic is 
then created between the Honeynet base stations and the decoy mobile devices Zone., using . ~:. 
adaptive antennas incorporated within =the design to face the signals away from the inside:. . ~~ 
.secure area. Because an attacker could come from many directions, the adaptive antennas: are 
used to provide a stronger signal in the direction of any attacking device. r ~: 
The third defense is position location and tracking. This is done in the Honeynet 
Zone and inside of the secure area. The idea is to have constant tracking of all devices in the 
_area. There are several methods available to locate and track a device that is giving off an 
RF signal. This thesis looks at combining all these methods into an integrated, and more 
robust, facility security system. Below in figure 1 is the block diagram of the integrated 
defense system. 
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Figure 1.1 Block diagram of the integrated defense s~~stem 
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Defense-in-Depth 
Defense-in-depth involves protecting a computer network with a series of 
defensive mechanisms such that if one mechanism fails, another will already be in 
place to thwart an attack. Because there are so many potential attackers with such a 
wide variety of attack methods available, there is no single method for successfully 
protecting a computer network. Utilizing the strategy of defense-in-depth will 
reduce the risk of having a successful and likely very costly attack on a network. 
The object of this thesis. is to explore the ideas of defense-in-depth and 
propose techniques to implement these ideas. The thesis looks at security with._ ~~ 
multiple layers. It shows that no security is full proof, so the best thing to do is -to . 
r.. - . 
give the attacker many roadblocks. The purpose of this is to get the attacker -to ~ give 
up the attack or-else be spoofed for some intelligence advantage, frustrating the: -. ~. ~ :. 
attacker at one of the layers, or causing the attacker to spend too much time at one of 
the layers. Doing this. will give security personnel more time to locate the attacker. 
In this thesis three different security approaches are utilized to represent the depth in 
the security scheme. This thesis uses many security design methods to detour 
attacks. [31 ] 
1.~ Research Contributions 
The key contributions of this research are the novel adaptations of existing ideas 
and technologies to the problem of providing comprehensive wireless network security 
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to a building, compound, or other such facility. Although the ideas and technologies are 
not completely new, they are being utilized in new and innovative ways. 
One of these ideas, directive radio frequency interference, is a new result of this 
work. Exhaustive searching of current literature did not produce a single instance of 
anyone proposing to use classic military electronic counter measures to secure a wireless 
network environment. This research looks at ways of directing the jamming signals in 
the direction of attackers without interfering with the secure area. This also utilizes the 
near-far-effect to the advantage of the secure area. 
Another contribution of this thesis is the utilization of stand-alone Honeynets. This 
thesis uses Honeynets in the wireless world to deceive the attacker. The Honeynet 
systems will give the attacker real ~~packets to try and intercept and decrypt, utilizing. :. 
. - ~ ~ 
decoy mobile devices on the wireless side, and servers and wireless base stations setup. 
. .. . ; 
on the hardwired side. This is to give a complete network environment. 
The unique contributions to Honeynet research presented by this thesis are .position 
location and tracking using RF signature.. This thesis utilizes not only a spoofed 
network, but provides the addition of decoy mobiles with spoofed traffic coming from 
these networks. The Honeynet layer is a complete stand-alone. The same protocols that 
are in a real network are in this network. 
The last contribution of this thesis deals with position location technology. The 
inside area of the secure facility is the area that will have trusted wireless networking. 
The issue for the inside deals with an attacker gaining access to this trusted area. The 
position location system will keep constant tracking of all mobile devices, once they 
access the trusted area. 
1.4 Literature Review 
Lathi B P, Modern Digital and Analog Communication Systems 
• The key methods for defeating spread spectrum systems were taken from this source. 
Both direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) and frequency hopping spread 
spectrum (FHSS) are covered. Chapter nine discusses DSSS and how to attack it 
using the near-far effect [p 410). Chapter nine discusses FHSS issues such as 
collisions and multi-path. 
Stahlberg Mika, Radio Jamming Attacks against Two Popular Mobile Networks 
• This paper discusses methods of j amming cellular phone systems. It goes into 
great detail of j arnming~ the call setup and traffic channels. 
Poisel, Richard, Introduction to ̀ communication electronic warfare systems ~ -, , ; . ; 
+~ ~ This text gives a great overview of many ideas of electronic warfare. It-discusses 
position location methods and how j amrning is done. It goes into great detail on 
the many different types of j amming, within communication systems. 
Internet Security Systems Wireless LAN Security 802.11 b and Corporate Networks 
• This text gave a detailed description of attacks against 802.11 networks. The 
attacks that are discussed in this thesis are against the physical layer. 
Hromatka, Thomas, Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FH-SSA, EE 521, Dept. Of 
Electrical and Computer En~ineerings Iowa State University: Ames, Iowa 
• This paper gave a ,great detailed description about frequency hopping spread 
spectrum. 
Eekhoff, Eric, An Overview of Smart Antenna Technology, EE 521, Dept. Of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering, Iowa State University: Ames, Iowa 
• The text and the papers listed above were used in developing an idea of how to 
utilize smart antennas within this thesis. 
Ganugapati , Vilay~ CDMA IS-95, EE 521, Dept. - Of Electrical and Computer Engineering1
Iowa State University: Ames,. Iowa 
• This document gave a good overview of how CDMA setup and call channels 
operate. 
Simon, Omura, Scholtz, Levitt, Spread Spectrum Communications Handbook ~ --
• This text gave a thorough detailed look at spread spectrum methods. This text 
was also a guide to methods of jamming. 
Walter GOJ, Synthetic-Aperture Radar and Electronic Warfare 
• This text went into great detail about many of the methods of jamming. 
Tom Karygiannis Les Owens National Institute of Standards and Technology Wireless 
Network Security 802.11, Bluetooth and Handheld Devices 
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• .This document went into great detail about how the 802.11 standard operates, 
giving a good picture of how the 802.11 works and how to attack it. 
Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg, David Wagener Intercepting Mobile Communications: The 
Insecurity of 802.11 
• This paper discussed the ways to intercept 802.11 transmissions. This paper also 
talks about the shortcoming of WEP and other security methods deployed by the 
802.11. 
1.5 Thesis organization 
This thesis is organized to .first give a look at a wireless communication overview. 
Next, it moves into spread spectrum methods. A look at Multiple Access Methods follows, 
along with a look at current Methods of Security and Electronic Warfare techniques. The 
next sections will go into the Research Contributions for this thesis. Last will be the , 
conclusion and a discussion of future work. 
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2. Wireless Communication Overview 
Table 2.1 Key Characteristics of 802.11 
Physical Layer Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS), Frequency Hopping 
Spread Spectrum (FHSS) 
Frequency Bands 2.4GHz (ISM band) and SGHz 
Hop rate 1 Mbps, 2Mbps, S.SMbps, 11Mbps (11b), 54Mbps (11 a), 54Mbps (11 g) 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) RC4-based stream encryption algorithm for 
confidentiality, authentication and integrity. Limited key management 
Operating Range About 100 feet indoors to over 1500 feet outdoors 
Positive Aspects Ethernet speeds without wires; many different products from many 
different companies. Wireless client cards and access point costs are decreasing. 
Negative Aspects Poor security in native mode; throughput decrease with distance 
and load. 
[39] 
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Table 2.2 IEEE 802.11 channels with frequencies 
Channel Frequency (GHz) 
1 2.412 
2 2.417 
3 2.422 
4 2.427 
5 2.432 
6 2.437 
7 2.442 
8 2.447 
9 ~ ~ 2.452 
10 2.457 
11 2.462 
[39] 
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25 MHZ 
2.400 2.412 
Channel 1 
2.437 
Channel 6 
Figure 2.2 Minimum Channel Spacing between center 
frequencies 802.11 
25 MHZ 
2.462 2.484 
Channel 11 
r~9~ 
2.1 Introduction 
. 2.2 Spread Spectrum Methods 
Spread Spectrum techniques involve the use of a variety of radio-frequency. 
modulation _techniques to provide a measure of security. Two reasons to use spread spectrum 
are to minimize the effects of jamming and to hide or conceal data by spreading the 
bandwidth that is needed to transmit a signal. Spread spectrum was developed by the United 
States Military to transmit codes -that were hard to detect and -hard to jam. The signal gets 
spread across a frequency spectrum. It makes the signal resistant to noise, eavesdropping and 
interference. 
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There are two main Spread Spectrum techniques in use today. The most common 
techniques are called direct sequence and frequency hopping. Direct sequence is a method 
that spreads the signal out over a great distance, hiding the signal within what most systems 
consider noise, and thereby creating resistance to signal Interference and jamming. 
Frequency hopping thwarts resistance through use of .its hopping sequence. In some 
frequency hopping systems, the signal hops 1600 times a second. This makes it hard for an 
attacker to find the correct frequency for interception and j amming. More complete 
descriptions of .frequency hopping and direct sequence can be found within the appendix 
sections Direct Sequence and Frequency Hopping. 
2.2.1 Direct Sequence 
Direct Sequence SpreadSpectrum (DSSS) is a transmission technology used in • - 
local-area wireless network{LAWN) transmissions where a data signal at the sending station 
is combined with a higher data rate bit sequence, or chipping code, that divides the user data 
according to.a spreading ratio This increases the signal's resistance to interference. The 
original data can be recovered due to the redundancy of the transmission, if one or more bits 
in the pattern are damaged during transmission. This is true in a manner of speaking but only 
occurs when very short bursts of noise happen. Otherwise, it is the correlation process that 
gives it the best properties. [52] 
2.2.2 Frequency hopping source 
Frequency Hopping Spread spectrum (FHSS) is a transmission technology used in 
local-area wireless network (LAWN) transmissions where the data signal is modulated with a 
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narrowband carrier signal that, "hops" in a random but predictable sequence from frequency 
to frequency as a function of time over a wide band of frequencies. The signal energy is 
spread in the time domain rather than chopping each bit into small pieces in the frequency 
domain. This technique reduces interference because a signal from a narrowband .system will 
only affect the spread spectrum signal if both are transmitting at the same frequency at the 
same time. If synchronized properly, a single logical channel is maintained. 
The transmission frequencies are determined by a spreading, or hopping, code. The receiver 
must be set to the same hopping code and must listen to the incoming signal at the right time 
and correct frequency in order to properly receive the signal. The FCC requires 
_manufacturers to use 75 or more frequencies per transmission channel with ~a maximum 
dwell time (the time spent at a particular frequency during any single hop) of 4:00 ~ms. [51] . 
2.3 Multiple Access Methods ~ ~ ~ ~ ~.: ' ~ - ~~ : . t , . 
2.3.1 Time Domairi~ ~ . 
Time domain is a representation of signal as a function of time. 
Ot = A(t) cos[2~fcz + ¢~ + ~(x)] Equation 2.1 
D =Envelope function (carries information) 
f c=carrier frequency 
t =Independent variable of time 
~ =Carrier Phase 
~cz> =Phase Function (this carriers the information) 
[33] 
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2.3.2 Frequency Domain 
Frequency domain is a representation of a signal as a function of spectrum. 
sn(t) = c(t)A(t) cos[2~~t + ¢E + ~] Equation 2.2 
A+~=constant over time interval 
[33] 
2.3.3 Code Division 
Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) is a military technology first used during 
World War II by the English allies to foil German attempts at jamming transmissions. The 
allies decided to transmit over several frequencies, instead of one, making it difficult for the 
Germans to pick up the complete signal. [53] 
CDMA works by converting speech into digital information, which is then 
transmitted as a radio signal over a wireless network. CDMA is a form of multiplexing. 
This allows numerous signals to occupy a single transmission channel, optimizing the use of 
available bandwidth without static, cross-talk or interference. CDMA is used in ultra-high- 
frequency (UHF cellular telephone systems in the 800-MHz and 1.9-GHz bands. [53] 
CDMA employs analog-to-digital conversion (ADC) in combination with spread 
spectrum technology. Audio input is first digitized into binary elements. The frequency of 
the transmitted signal is then made to vary according to a defined pattern (code). A receiver, 
whose frequency response is programmed with the same code, is the only device that can 
intercept the signal. There are trillions of possible frequency-sequencing codes; this 
enhances privacy and makes cloning difficult. [53] 
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2.4 Wireless Networking Systems 
2.4.1 IEEE 802.11b 
This standard is also referred to as 802.11 High Rate or Wi-Fi. 802.1 lb is an extension to 
802.11 that applies to wireless LAN networks and provides 11 Mbps transmission. It has a 
fallback to 5.5, 2 and 1 Mbps in the 2.4 GHz band. 802.1 lb uses DSSS. 802.1 lb is a 
modification to the origina1802.11 standard, allowing wireless functionality comparable to 
Ethernet. [55] 
2.4..2 GSM 
Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) is a sophisticated cellular system used 
worldwide which was designed in Europe. Amore complete description is in the Appendix 
section .GSM. [55] 
2.4.3 IS-95 CDMA 
This is a standard which describes a cell system which uses a CDMA link and 
operates at 800 MHz. Sometimes the term is also used to describe 1900 MHz CDMA. A 
more complete description of IS-95 can be found in the appendix section IS-95. [55] 
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3. Electronic Warfare and Electronic Security 
3.1 Methods of Electronic Warfare 
3.1.1 Electronic Warfare (EW) 
Electronic Warfare involves electromagnetism and directed energy to control the 
electromagnetic spectrum of transmitted data. There are three major subdivisions within 
electronic warfare: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. 
[29] 
3.2 Denial of Service . 
3.2.1 Jamming .~ 
Denial of Service (electronic attack) 
Jamming is a form of ECM in which noise or noise like signals are transmitted at 
frequencies in the receiver bandpass to obscure the signal. This is the deliberate radiation, 
reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of disrupting enemy use 
of electronic devices, equipment, or systems. Jamming prevents a victim's receiver from 
demodulating the correct signal. 
This process can also be used to defend, rather than attack, a wireless network work 
environment. This research uses the ECM signals to prevent the receiver used by an attacker 
from demodulating the signals from the inside secure area. [29] 
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Anti jam 
The jammer-to-signal (J/S) ratio, also known as the anti jam (AJ) margin, provides a 
measure of how vulnerable a system is to interference. A lazgerjammer-to-signal ratio 
represents a greater system capability for noise rejection. The equation for (J/S) is given in 
Eq. 3.3. Gp is the processing gain of the system and is equal to the spreading bandwidth (WSS) 
divided by the data rate, R, in bits per second. Eb is the bit energy. Jo is the equivalent noise 
power spectral density (PSD) due to the jammer. The ratio (Eb/Ja) is the SNR required to 
maintain the connection at a specified error probability. [48] 
Gp
s  En~Jo 
Equation 3.3 [48] 
There is an actual J/S and a minimum required J/S at the receiver input. 
The AJ margin (M,4,i) is equal to the processing gain times the difference between the 
reciprocals of the signal-to jammer ratios received and required. A larger M~ signifies a 
system with greater noise rejection capability. [48] 
MAC = Gp 
1 - 1 1 
J J 
►S recv s recdv 
Equation 3.4 [48] 
Directive radio frequency Interference 
By directing the radiation pattern in a given area, directive radio frequency 
interference allows the jamming signals to act has an invisible barrier. This is the key to this 
portion of the research. In the section below about the Yagi antenna, Yagi antenna array 
setup is discussed. 
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The Yagi antenna array will face in a given direction away from the secure area. The 
goal of this is to jam the call setup and traffic channels in the physical layer by pointing the 
interference signals around the base in a geometric configuration that will give total coverage 
of the target area. This will keep hostile mobiles from sending signals from a hostile call 
setup, and from using a hostile mobile unit to receive .signals. The process of directing RF 
signals will allow a geographic zone to protect the, facility. This will create a large jamming 
signal that prevents the unfriendly receiver from acquiring and demodulating the friendly 
transmitter signals. 
3.2.2 Network Flooding 
This is a form of denial of service: Network flooding is when a network gets 
congested from too much traffic. This is done in more then one way. Getting too many 
requests to connect is one way to -flood a networl~. This is known as a syn flood attack. In 
terms of a wireless network, this is done when the wireless channel is filled to capacity or the 
base station can no longer expect connections. A good example of this is the Sprint PCS 
network. When Sprint PCS base stations become flooded, the system will not allow a user to 
place a call. 
3.3 Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping is when a system is setup to intercept a signal between two parties. 
Placing the interceptor within reception range of two communicating stations is one 
eavesdropping technique used in wireless communication, and is a technique of choice for 
government agencies like the National Security Agency (NSA). NSA has towers and other 
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devices setup around the world to eavesdrop on countries. Blind Man's Bluff is an example 
of a site used by the National Security Agency and Naval Intelligence to eavesdrop on others 
through the use of inductance given off from devices such as network cords and monitors. 
The Navy was able to eavesdrop on the Soviet Union by putting a device on a Russian cable 
located under water. The device was able to record all traffic going along the cable using 
measurements based on radiation leaks and cable inductance. [62] Another example of this 
can be found through examination of U.S. Navy ships and airplanes designed to intercept 
communications. Requiring close proximity to the signals being produced, these ships have 
been utilized on many Navy eavesdropping missions. [68] Figure 33 demonstrates an 
example of placing a device in between two communication towers. 
This research gives a method to stop this from happening. Eavesdropping is a 
unique challenge, and is a particularly serious problem for wireless security,-
Base A Interceptor Base B 
Figure 3.3 Signal Intercept/ Eaves dropping redone by Sadhana Jackson 
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3.4 Spoofing and Cloning 
Spoofing is the process of faking a signal or a system that will fool users. Spoofing 
is done in many different ways. IP address spoofing is when an attacker fakes an IP address 
and pretends to be someone else. In the wireless world an attacker could pretend to be a base 
station and route traffic through it. Another example of spoofing in the wireless world deals 
with an attacker on the same channel transmitting false data. This is what the scenario shows 
below. 
Valid 
transmitter 
Cooperation 
Attack 
transmitter 
. Wireless channel 
~ Cooperation ~ 
Valid receiver 
Interceptor receiver 
Figure 3.4 Counterfeit Base Scenario [33J redone by Nichole Taylor and Sadhana 
Jackson 
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3.5 Position-Location of hostile Portables 
Time of Arrival (TOA) 
The wireless device's signal is received at various antenna sites. Since each antenna 
is usually different distances from the device, the signal arrives at different times for each 
antenna. This technique requires signal timing information from at least three different 
antenna sites. [33] 
Direction of Arrival (DOA) 
This is also known as angle of arrival. The wireless device's signal is received at 
various antenna sites. Each antenna site is also equipped with additional gear to detect the 
compass direction from which the device's signal is arriving. [33] 
Ranging . 
Ranging is a technique that is an active system, which sends out a signal to or from a 
mobile and reflects the signal back to the ranging station. The system then uses the round 
trip time delay to calculate the distance. The long integration time allows good performance 
in a signal to noise environment. [33] 
Position location by strength of signal 
This method is an idea from electromagnetic theory that uses the transmitted power of 
a mobile to locate the mobile. This is a method works with at least two base stations. For 
better results more base stations are needed. The base stations that are nearest to the source 
of the RF signal will receive the signal from the mobile station. [33] 
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3.6 Antennas 
_Adaptive Antenna arrays 
Adaptive antenna arrays, or smart antennas, use a combination of an array of multiple 
antennas and appropriate signal processing to produce desirable antenna patterns. Such 
patterns have high gain in the direction of desired signals and null gain in the direction of 
undesired signals. Antenna arrays allow for multiple accesses. Adaptive arrays are used 
extensively in third generation cellular. Adaptive arrays can be used to maintain a beam of 
desired shape. [49] 
Adaptive antenna arrays are used by this thesis for a few reasons. The first use of 
adaptive antenna arrays is at the_ Zone of Interference. The idea is to have an array of 
jamming stations set up around the perimeter of a facility. The jamming stations will use 
Yagi antennas. This is explained with greater detail in the section Zone Of Interference. 
The array -will give maximum coverage around the given area. When a hostile mobile device 
comes. into the area of the jamming stations the signal will concentrate on the device. 
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4. Wireless Facility Defense-in-Depth 
4.1 Integrated Facility Security —Threat Assessment 
There are many security concerns that come when dealing with wireless connectivity 
for a high security facility. They are as follows. 
1. Signal intercept 
2. Radiation leaks 
3. Jamming 
4. Locating rogue wireless devices (one in the azea) 
5. Position location of facility personal by un-friendlies 
These issues have been thought during the research process for this thesis. The next 
section, Integrated Facility Security, discusses how an attacker will approach the> secure 
facility, and the processes that will occur at each level. The security for the thesis 
research is as follows. 
1. Zone of Interference 
2. Honeynet layer 
3. Position Location and Tracking 
Integrated Facility Security 
In order to explore the ways of implementing security to deal the issues just 
presented, the concepts and theories must be discussed first. There are three approaches that 
will be discussed in following sections: 
1. The use of electronic countermeasures against an attacker. 
2. Position-Location of an attack transmitter. 
3. Spoofing of an attacker using a Honeynet. 
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The next section will show the concepts and theories of locating the RF signal. Once 
the RF signal has been located, various techniques will be used to track and locate the signal 
from the base station. The last technique that will be discussed deals with setting up a 
wireless communication system that attracts the attacker rather than sacrificing the real 
network.. This is a theoretical but practical approach that. will keep attackers busy so the 
security personnel can track and intercept the attacker. 
The Zone of Interference is the first layer an attacker would come to. The idea of this 
Zone of Interference is to direct jamming signals in a .direction that faces away from the 
secure area, creating a zone of protection around the secured area and convincing the attacker 
that wireless connectivity has been achieved. 
Step 1 
Attacker approaches the area with their mobile station. Some attackers will try to 
passively attack the area. This is done with signal interception. The attacker has their. mobile 
station in what is called promiscuous mode. This is when the wireless network interface card 
sees all packets. The goal of the wireless network interface card is to demodulate the signals 
coming from a base station. When the attacker is within the Zone of Interference they will 
.not be able to see the signals from the base stations. As stated earlier, the jamming stations 
will take advantage of the near-far-effect. The jamming stations will be closer and sending 
out a stronger signal then the base stations. This means that the signal the attacker -will be 
forced to receive will be the signal coming from the jamming station. 
The Zone of Interference will not only stop passive attacks, but active attacks too. 
For these attacks to work the attacker will have to receive a signal. The next form of an 
attack that can be tried is the rogue base station. If an attacker were attempting to setup a 
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rogue base station on the perimeter of the area, they would try to get friendly mobile stations 
to connect to it. This would cause passwords, usernames and other vital data to be 
compromised. The Zone of Interference would once again be able to stop this form of attack. 
The j amming stations would radiate. a signal out in the direction of rogue station and mobiles 
that it might be able to contact. 
Step 2 
The first layer of security is good but not fool proof. With enough time an attacker 
will be able to figure out that within certain locations, their network interface cards are not 
responding the way they want them to. So an attacker might try to move closer within the 
area. This is to get more effective access to the signals they wish to .intercept. Once the 
attacker gets beyond the Zone of Interference, they will come to the Honeynet system° Once 
coming to this layer of defense the attacker will pick up a signal. The signal they will pick 
up, however, will be from the Honeynet system. The Honeynet system has two purposes. 
The first is to distract the attacker. When the attacker comes.to this location they will see 
.spoofed signals. Not only will they see spoofed signals, .but also the packets they see will be 
encrypted. The attacker will then see fake mobile stations as well. These -stations are set up 
to give the attacker real data in transmission. If data were only being sent between stations 
an attacker would be able to realize the network is a decoy through simple network analysis. 
The attacker will see traffic between decoy mobile stations that are placed around the 
Honeynet area. 
A savvy attacker, however, will do research into their target before attacking. To foil 
such research, the attacker is provided with an area that has all of the same things a real 
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network has. There are mobile units talking between the base stations, as well as mobile 
stations beaconing for a signal from .abase station. These are just a few things an attacker 
will see within this area. 
Once mobile stations are picked up by the Honeynet system, the system will 
determine whether the station is friend or foe using the MAC Address and the spectral 
characteristics of the network interface card. Then the position locator at the Honeynet Zone 
will perform position location and tracking to confirm the identity of the mobile unit. 
Step 3 
The next layer of security that an attacker will come to is the position locator within the - 
secured area. Any mobile station entering the secured area is tracked, and its location is 
monitored, keeping the station space :under. constant observation. As soon as an attacker 
decides to~ either launch an attack or tries to~ exploit the system; the security system will know 
where the hostile mobile station is located. 
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4.2 Overall Geographic Design 
The above geography represents an example of the area that is being secured. 
The outer rings represent the Zone of Interference. This is only a rough drawing of an 
example area. In the following sections the identical drawing is given for the next layer of 
security. 
~~~ ~.,._ . >-.t~. 
Figure 4.4 Overall Geographic Design 
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4.3 Electronic Countermeasures —Zone of Interference 
The design process of this part of the defense-in-depth concept is very important. 
The Zone of Interference (dubbed the "cone of silence") is the first line of defense. The 
jamming concept discussed previously will be the key to these countermeasures. The ideas 
or theories behind this research are to use jamming as a defense instead of its usual role as an 
offense. No record of a technique like this exists in print, and discussions with members of 
the National Security Agency reflected interest in this technique as a novel approach to 
wireless security concerns. The reason j a~mming would work is simple. The advantage of 
the near-far effect and the low j~ing margins of commercial designs such as 802.1 lb 
(direct sequence spread spectrum) make it easy to jam attacker receivers. For example, the 
~-jamming margin of 802.1 lb is~ only around 10. The designers of IEEE 802. I lb only used the 
bare rriinimum to satisfy the FCC requirement. In contrast, the GPS military system has a 
jamming margin of 200,000: [32] . 
`When a Zone of Interference is set up, it would,_ in theory, block the unfriendly 
receiver from correctly zeceiving any signals from inside the facility, including tie base 
station it is trying to attack. [32] The goal is to direct the jamming energy in the direction of 
the insecure area while reducing it to acceptable levels inside the facility. The goal is to 
create a Zone of Interference that surrounds the area. 
The way to achieve this is to use directive antennas and antenna arrays. This will 
allow the electronic countermeasure signals to be directed outward. Figure 4.5 is an example 
of the jamming situation for the secure area. 
The goal of this system is to j am multiple types of wireless connections. The next 
sections will discuss multiple techniques of j amming wireless system frequency bands such 
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as 802.11 and the cellular ranges. This thesis will show two jammer designs. The first is for 
direct sequence and the other is for frequency hopping. The use of the near-far-effect as a 
key element in securing wireless systems is central to this thesis. By jamming the geographic 
area outside of the secure zone, the signal strength of the jamming signal will be greater than 
the signal that the attacker is attempting to compromise. [33] This thesis shows how the 
near-far-effect will be able to play a major role in the wireless network connectivity security 
of a facility. The transmitter's stations are placed in a ring like pattern around the area. Each 
station is set an array to give a stronger signal. [33] 
Effectiveness of Jamming Zone 
The jammer sphere of influence will allow the signals from the jammer to overpower 
any signals coming from the secure .area. The power of the jammer will cause the mobile to 
demodulate the jammers signal. The Zone of Interference takes advantage of the near-faz 
effect. This states that power varies by 1 2 in respect to distance (d) between the base .and 
d 
the mobile device. This says that the. signal will deplete has the signal travels further from . 
the source transmitter. The incoming mobile receiver will acquire the signal that is nearest 
and most powerful. [33] 
There are disadvantages to the jamming system in terms of friendly communications. 
There is no way of the jamming system to tell friend from foe. Friendly communication 
would be disabled within the jammer's sphere of influence. A visual example is shown in 
figure 4.4 
31 
The Near-Far Effect 
Near-Far Ratio 
T = P 1/Pr2 - PTIGT1Grl~T2G'T2Gr2(d2/dl)2NF r 
TNF -=1 is ideal 
TX Antenna 
dl
d2
Figure 4.4 [33] redone by Nichole Taylor and Sadhana Jackson 
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Jammer Types 
Barrage jamming 
Jamming is accomplished by transmitting a band of frequencies that is large with 
respect to the bandwidth of a single emitter. Barrage jamming may be accomplished by 
presetting multiple jammers on adjacent frequencies or by using a single wideband 
transmitter. Barrage jamming makes it possible to jam emitters and receivers on different 
frequencies simultaneously and reduces the need for operator assistance or complex control 
equipment. These advantages are gained at the expense of reduced jamming power at any 
given frequency. [33] 
Barrage jamming is ideal fox the jamming process proposed here. The jamming zone ,.: 
has to jam direct sequence and frequency hopping spread spectrum. Direct sequence is a 
narrow band system. This is not the case for frequency hopping, which uses a wide band 
system. Knowing this makes barrage jamming one of the best methods to utilize. Since the 
goal is to deal with both spread spectrum systems, this thesis will use wide barrage jamming, 
thus covering both spread spectrum systems. The research shows two jammer designs are 
needed, to cover both FHSS and DSSS. The following section gives an example of how the 
jammers -will work. The example used is GSM cellular. The methods used for j amming 
CDMA and 802.11 b DS S S are similar. [33] 
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Smart Jamming 
There are many ways to turn a j ammer into a smart jammer. Within this thesis a 
design is presented to perform smart jamming for direct sequence and frequency hopping 
spread spectrum systems. In the sections for j amming a greater explanation is given of smart 
~ ammmg. 
4.3.1 Geographic 
Design 
Figure 4.5 Geographic Design for Zone of Interference 
The outer ring of the diagram represents the Zone of Interference. 
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4.3.2 Antenna Design -Directive RF Interference 
This is a process utilized with the system. By directing the radiation pattern in a 
given area, allows jamming signals act as an invisible barrier. This is the key to this portion 
of the research. In the section below about the Yagi antenna, will describe how the Yagi 
antennas are set up in an array. The Yagi antenna array will face in a given direction away 
from the secure communications and Honeynet areas. The goal of this is to jam the call setup 
and traffic channels in the physical layer, by pointing the interference signals in particular 
directions around the base, giving total coverage. This will keep hostile mobiles from 
receiving the signal, and will jam the call setup on the attacker's mobile device. The process 
of directing RF signals will allow a geographic zone to protect the facility. This will create a 
large jamming signal that prevents the ~ unfriendly receiver from acquiring and demodulating 
the friendly transmitter signaYs. [33] 
Figure 4.6 Jammer sphere of influence example 
This diagram shows how the jamming systems sphere influence works against the 
attacking mobile. This shows how the jammer is not allowing the mobile to receive. and. 
_transmit correctly. 
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RF downlink 
Jammer sphere o f 
influence 
[41] Figure 4.6 redone by Nichole Taylor and Sadhana Jackson 
4.3.3 Jammer Design for DSSS and FHSS 
m(t) m(t)*p(t) w(t)*m(t)*p(t) 
Low rate 
p(t) W(t) 
Amplifier 
PN~ VCO  eo~t) 
High rate 
Output signal 
Figure 4.7a DSSS jamming block diagram [47] and author redone by Nichole Taylor 
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4.3.3.3.1 Direct sequence jammer components 
m(t)= message signal 
c(t)= polar signal (pseudo random carrier) 
VCO= voltage control oscillator 
Amplifier= this is used to make the signal stronger 
w (t)= output signal 
eo(t)= external voltage 
[32] [33] (35] 
m(t) m(t)*c(t) w(t)*m(t)*c(t) 
FSK generator 
Frequency 
synthesizer 
1 
PN~ 
Low rate 
p(t) 
PN~ 
High 
rate 
VCO 
w(t) 
eott) 
Amplifier 
output signal 
Figure 4.7b jamming block diagram for FHSS [32] and author redone by Nichole 
Taylor 
4.3.3.3.2 FHSS jammer components 
FSK generator— frequency scheduling key generator 
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Frequency synthesizer= helps determine the frequency to hop 
m(t)= message signal 
c(t)= polar signal (pseudo random carrier) 
VCO= voltage control oscillator 
Amplifier= this is used to make the signal stronger 
w (t)= output signal 
eo(t)= external voltage 
[32] [33] [35l 
4.3.3.3.3 Jamming process and design 
The jammer for direct sequence spread spectrum is able to work for a few reasons. 
Primarily, this technique generates a signal across the frequency range of the target signal 
that looks like noise to receivers. This means direct sequence receivers will be not able to 
demodulate the signals correctly. This jammer design sends out two polar signals, a high rate 
and a low rate. The amplifier in the design serves to over power other signals. This is 
another concept drawing on the principle of near-far-effect. [35] 
As explained in the section for DSSS, the polar signal is used to put the message 
back together, confusing the attacking receiver through the use of multiple polar signals. 
This is the method the jammer will use to do what is known has smart jamming. The section 
of DSSS weakness that the jammer exploits within the Zone of Interference explains in 
greater detail the process that is used. [35] 
The same concepts are used for frequency hopping spread spectrum. The jammer for 
frequency hopping has both a frequency synthesizer and frequency scheduling key generator. 
The pseudo random number generator is connected to the frequency synthesizer. Recall that 
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in frequency hopping the generated frequency shift key is shifted by an amount deternuned 
by the pseudo random number generated code. The frequency shift keying is added with the 
synthesizer frequency and the frequency shift keying. This design will send signals out for a 
wide band system. The band pass Ater selects the sum frequencies and suppresses the 
difference frequencies. The data then gets transmitted. The data then hopes over a range of 
frequencies that is determined according to the pseudo random number generated code. [35] 
This will cover the whole frequency band. It is known that frequency hopping is 
able to avoid interception and jamming because of the hopping sequence. In military system 
the hopping sequence is around 1600 hops per second. The design also will try to confuse 
the receiver of an attacker. A greater description of both systems and the jammer design is 
include within the following sections. First will be shown a brief description of how 
frequency hopping and direct sequence works. Then the process for beating both spread 
spectrum systems will be presented. [35] 
The jamming transmitter designs contain a voltage control oscillator (VCO). This is 
to determine the frequency to jam: Amore complete description of VCO is in the section 
methods of jamming. Each jamming station has the circuits that were just described. 
4.3.3.3.4 Methods of jammer operation 
These aze just two methods proposed by this thesis to jam within the Zone of 
Interference. The next is a method that the transmitter in the jamming design will use to fool 
the receiver of the attacking mobile device. This process is explained in the section below. 
First is the equation for the voltage control oscillator (VCO). By using a VCO within 
the circuit, the jammer is allowed to sweep the whole frequency range forward and back. 
This is to prevent the need to guess where the signal is located in the range. For example, a 
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signal could be at 2.43 GHZ. A jammer would have to know this in order to jam the signal. 
By jamming the whole spectrum range, guessing is eliminated. The following equation 
shows how the output signal is deternuned. [35] 
Constant 
1 
Output 
signal 
Equation 4.4 [38] 
t) = W C ~,,, C ep (t) 
The eternal voltage 
that you choose 
Lowest freq. of VCO 
(when voltage ISO) 
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VCO generates a sine wave of the frequency you want to jam 
1V 
-1V  
f=1/T 
Figure 4.8 VCO [38J 
If a frequency change were desired, the voltage would have to be changed. 
Frequency changes linearly with the voltage. This design is universal for the frequencies 
that this thesis proposes to jam within the Zone of Interference. The VCO would need to 
be changed to adjust to the 802.11 and cellular frequencies. [35](38) 
The jammer has an amplifier connected to it. This is to make the signal stronger 
to cover the given area. By amplifying the signal, it will give noise to the frequency 
range it is trying to attack. This will drown out frequency hopping and the frequency 
shift key will not have anywhere to hop. The amplifier helps to take advantage of the 
near far problem within direct sequence. As stated earlier, power is the key to this 
design. It will have the power to generate the signals over the given area. [35] [38] 
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4.3.3.5 Process for Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum [32][33] 
s(t) = c(t)A(t) cos[2~~~ + ~ + ~cr>] equation 4.5 
A(t) and ~cr> =informative functions 
f c =carrier frequency 
¢E =carrier phase 
c(t)=the spreading code 
c(t) _ ± 1 + 1 ~ 8° phase 
—1 ~ ±180° phase 
c(t) is the spreading code. It is a pseudo random waveform used to show that the structure of 
the wave form. Using this shows that the structure of the waveform comes from algebraic 
coding theory. ± 1 represents a square or rectangle wave. It is basically an inverter. 
X;(t) = I';kA(t) cos[2~~t + ¢~; + ¢E] Equation 4.6 
The receiver of a direct sequence receiver has the same Tx code as the transmitter. 
This yields the algebraic expressions 
f~V$rjk~l~ 1=~ 
equation 4.6, equation 4.7 
k ~ j This can not get any larger than one. It can yield a negative number. 
—1< r;k ~+1 
This process restores the original equation with a multiplied factor. 
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Next is another example of the process that has just been explained. This process uses 
the equation 
y (t) =m (t) * c (t) Equation 4.8 [35] 
.(t) 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
i —► 
y(t) 
~ ~ ~ 
Figure 4.9 Wave forms direct sequence Spread Spectrum [35] 
t~ 
~~ 
The diagram that shows the signals m(t), c(t), and y(t) states that c(t) is a factor 
between -1 and +1. The polar signal c(t) represents the binary sequence which is the 
pseudorandom carrier. This is multiplied by m(t). The equation representing this is 
below. The symbol m(t) represents the message signal. This is how the system is able to 
get the direct sequence signal, which is represented by y(t). The value of c(t) seems to be 
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unpredictable. But it can be generated by deterministic means. That is why it is called 
pseudorandom. [35] 
The other part to this process is the receiver. At the receiver a synchronous version of 
the pseudorandom sequence c(t) used at the transmitter. The signal that is received y(t) is 
multiplied by c(t). After multiplying c(t) and y(t) they yield the desired m(t). This is how the 
message is recovered at the receiver. This is represented by the equation below. 
2 2 
y(t)*c(t)=m(t)*c (t)=m(t) because c (t)=1 equation 4.9, equation 4.10 [35] 
4.3.3.5.1 DSSS weaknesses that the jammer exploits within the zone 
Direct sequence suffers from the near-far problem. It assumes that the signals from 
all. users are received with .the same signal power. This is far from true. The near-far-effect 
occurs during the dispreading process. The dispreading of a desired signal increases its 
strength N-fold compared to the residual noise level. This is because of unwanted signals. If 
unwanted signal strength is strong due to the proximity of its transmitter to the receiver, the 
strength of the desired signal is weak due to the remoteness of its transmitter from the 
receiver; the undesired signal will therefore drown out the desired signal. [35J 
4.3.3.5.2 How the Jammer works against DSSS 
In both direct sequence and frequency hopping, a pseudorandom number generator is 
used. In direct sequence the pseudorandom number generator is the value c(t). Recalling 
that c(t) is used to demodulate the signal. The design has two pseudorandom number 
generators. One is a high rate and one is a low rate. The process is rather simple. The two 
pseudorandom number generators will have to produce different results. If the high rate 
pseudorandom number generator produces a 1, the low rate will produce a 0 or a -l. The 
goal is to produce conflicting results. By doing this the receiver of the attacker will try to de- 
modulate both signals and get confused by the jamming signal. This will cause the receiver 
within the zone to be unable to de-modulate a good signal. It is then being denied service, or 
jammed. With the algebraic theory representation this process will yield an answer larger 
then one. This causes the receiver of the attacking mobile device to be confused. This would 
deny it service within the Zone of Interference. [38][32[33][35] 
4.3.3.6 Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum 
Frequency shift keying transmits either a 0 or a 1 by sending out sinusoid pulses. . The ~~ 
frequency shift keying is used by frequency hopping. The frequency shift key is.generated 
and is then shifted to another frequency. This is done by an amount determined by the 
pseudorandom number generator. At the receiver a frequency mixer with frequency 
controlled by an identical pseudorandom number generator code synchronized with the 
received signal shifts the frequencies back to the original frequency shift key frequency. The 
resulting frequency shift key is then demodulated. [35) 
4.3.3.6.1 FHSS Weaknesses that the jammer exploits within the zone 
Frequency hopping does not have the same resistance to jamming as direct sequence. 
Frequency hopping achieves jamming resistance by randomly hopping the frequency. This is 
how it avoids the jammer frequency. Because of this collisions do occur. Knowing this 
information, a j ammer could simply jam the entire frequency range of a device. This would 
45 
give the device no frequency to hop to. For example, within 802.11, if an attacker j wed 
the 2.4 GHz frequency range, the frequency shift key would have nowhere to hop. 
Knowing this, the jammer will send out identical waveforms to that of a frequency 
hopping spread spectrum system. The enemy's receiver will see two different signals within 
the Zone of Interference. This will cause the receiver to be confused and not work correctly. 
This is a backup method to cause denial of service within the Zone for frequency hopping 
spread spectrum. [35] 
4.3.3.7 Jamming of rogue base stations 
This thesis research on jamming concentrates on jamming of the mobile device. But 
it is known that an attacker could possibly try to set up a rogue base station to gather 
information. Even though this design discusses the use of directional antennas, signals can 
still•bounce off of objects. Or persons could still try and access things too early. They might 
come in contact with the rogue base station that an attacker has set up. Laptop computers 
and other smaller device can be set up to act has a base. station. This is not as much. of a 
worry as an attacking mobile. But it is an issue that has been brought to light. Some methods 
are discussed within the appendix section for GSM for jamming base stations. The jamming 
techniques for jamming CDMA are quite similar to that of GSM. [45] 
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4.4 Position-location 
4.4.1 Geographic Design 
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Figure 4.10 Geographic Design. position location with Radiation Pattern inside secure 
zone figure done by Nichole Taylor and Sadhana Jackson 
4.4.2 Antenna Design 
The design of the antennas is very simple for this layer. The system uses directional 
antennas for this layer. This layer does not utilize adaptive antennas. The goal is to point the 
radiation towards the inside. Then the antennas will also point to each of the base stations on 
the inside. By doing this process should minimize bleeding of the radiation into -the other 
layers of defense. 
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4.4.3 Information Processing 
Design 
GIS Engine 
Position Location 
technologies 
Display of 
map with 
location of 
mobile device 
Figure 4.11 Information Processing Block Design inside position location System 
The above diagram shows how the inside position locating and tracking will be 
done. First the base station or base stations will pick up the mobile device. Then the base 
station will send a signal to the position location. Then the position location will send a 
signal to the GIS engine, this in turns gathers information from the GIS database and the 
base maps. This information is then sent to the display of the map with the location of 
the device or devices. 
4.4.4 Methods of the Position location system 
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involves the multi-path problem. Multi-path is described within appendix E, Position 
location methods. There will be many signals within the inside secure area. The problem of 
signal collision has therefore been addressed. [32] 
4.5 Wireless Honeynet 
4.5.1 Geographic Design 
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Figure 4.12 Geographic Design Honeynet Position location with radiation pattern. Done 
by Nichole Taylor and Sadhana Jackson 
This is the radiation pattern of the Honeynet base stations. The dots surrounding 
the secure area represent the picture of the Honeynet base station. 
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Figure 4.13 radiation patterns of the Honeynet base stations 
This pattern represents the radiation pattern for the directional antennas for communication in 
the secure area. 
Figure 4.14 radiation pattern for directional antennas for secure area 
~~ The circles that surround the Honeynet stations represent the area that the 
position located will search in. 
Figure 4.15 Honeynet stations 
4.5.2 Design of the System - - - 
The s stems design is performed in several stages. The reason for this is not only y 
does the system need placement in a specific area, but the goal is to have it look just like a 
real wireless system. This ~s a key part. If the system does not look as if it is in use, this will 
.let attackers know that it is only a decoy system. Once again the wireless Honeynet is the 
second line of defense for this defense-in-depth study. The following sections will go into 
further depth about design theories of the wireless Honeynet. Avery important point to 
mention is this research does not go into new areas of designing a Honeynet. The point of 
this research is adapting the idea of Honeynet to the wireless world. [32] 
The idea for this research is to have the Honeynet not connected to the real network. 
The Honeynet system will be total separated from the real wireless network. It is located at 
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the second layer of defense. This concept of Honeynet is not new, but the idea to have a total 
system independent of the real one is somewhat new. So this layer of defense it a total 
stand-alone system. [32] 
This thesis will show methods of building a Honeynet system from the side of the 
hardware. The software is discussed, but great detail is not given. The detail given about the 
software is mentioned but no real detail. This thesis does talk about the integration of the 
two, yet concentrates on the hardware. [32] 
4.5.3 Honeynet Deployment 
Area of coverage and Placing ~of Honeynet Base stations 
.The diagram shows how to place the Honeynet stations. Depending on the geography 
the placement of the Honeynet stations might be slightly different. The reason for this is 
signals have a way of interacting with objects. So if the secure wireless facility is in a 
mountainous region, signals will bouncy off the mountain ranges. This is an example of an 
area being covered. This thesis does not take into account the weather conditions and other 
environmental conditions that could change the RF signal propagation. The antenna type that 
will be used is an adaptive antenna, giving the signal more signal strength in the direction of 
the rogue mobile host. This thesis gives a general idea of signal propagation, when traveling 
through the air. [33] 
The placing of the Honeynet stations will be very similar no matter what type 
arrangement the facility is. The diagram below shows how the stations are placed diagonal 
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from each other. This is done for a few reasons. Below is a list of goals that this setup will 
accomplish. 
1. Allow position location to be done. Look at the section. Position location by 
Radiofrequency signal strength 
2. Line of sight for RF signal to travel 
3. Make this decoy network appear to be the real thing 
4. Lure an .attacker to the decoy network. 
There is a buffer zone between the real network and the decoy network. There are a 
few reasons for this. Signals are able to bounce off objects. So even though the directional 
antennas are set up, the buffer zone is to minimize signal interference. The antennas that are 
in use will adapt. to the mobile. connecting to that base station. Knowing this the zone will 
make sure.the Honeynet antennas will not have,any attraction to the mobiles on the inside 
zone. This is the method this thesis proposes to keep the zones separate. The diagram below 
shows in detail the methods just described. 
4.5.4 Antenna and Access Point Design 
Antenna type 
To obtain the desired effect, adaptive antennas are used. An Adaptive antenna is an 
antenna that controls its own pattern, by means of feedback control, while the antenna 
operates. Some adaptive Antennas also control their own frequency. Adaptive Antennas are 
ideal for various reasons. An attacker could come from many angles. So the idea is to use 
the Adaptive array to cover all angles that an attacker may approach from. Amore complete 
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description of Adaptive Antennas is in the section on Adaptive Antennas and the appendix 
section Antennas. [40] 
4.5.5 Network Design , 
Server 
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Firewall Decoy 
Netwo rk 
~'irewall 
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T Mobile device 
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Wireless 
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Mobile 
Attack device 
(mobile) (decoy) 
Figure 4.16 Honeynet Block Diagram [32] redone by Nichole Taylor and Sadhana 
Jackson 
Figure 4.16 shows the network conk guration design of the Honeynet layer. This zone 
is made up of stand-alone servers with wireless base stations and decoy mobile stations. The 
above block diagram shows the mobile decoys and the attacking mobile stations. The 
attacking mobile will see network traffic between mobiles and other parts of the wireless, 
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system. In the following sections is the detail of the design of the protocols needed to make 
this decoy network spoof network traffic. 
4.5.5.1 Server and the base station Design 
The design of the servers and base stations are identical to real network servers. The 
base stations are connected to the firewalls and the firewalls are connected to the servers. 
This is the same type of set up real networks should have. This gives the attacker the idea of 
added protection to the wired network. 
4.5.5.2 Spoofed Network _Traffic 
The network traffic will have to show the presence of a real network. The artificial 
.: , 
intelligence to the design of the spoofed traffic will have real messages within the packets. 
The spoofed traffic will supply, false and deceptive information. This process simulates a 
real network. This network is being designed for a Department of Defense system. So the 
traffic will to appeaz to give important information to an attacker. The only thing is the 
information is false. The data has a level of encryption. If the traffic did not have encryption 
an attacker would be able to realize that the network is a decoy. Then to decrypt the packets, 
the attacker will have to collect a given amount of packets being sent. [32] 
4.5.5.3 Spoofed Mobiles devices 
There are many things the decoy mobiles will do, in order to make an attacker believe 
that it is an authentic network. The mobile will have the same protocols as a real network. 
The mobiles will run the same protocols but not at the same time. For example while one 
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mobile is in beacon mode, another decoy mobile will be in transmit mode. The goal of this 
thesis is to start the process of designing the Honeynet system. This thesis lays out the 
groundwork that other students will use to design the software, which will drive the system. 
The software design for the decoy mobiles will do many things. First the design will 
have an artificial intelligence to the design. The reason being is the mobile decoys will have 
to do protocols in a somewhat pseudo random order. Then the decoy mobiles will not keep 
the same order. This is to make sure an attacker will not see the same communications 
between the decoy mobiles and the base stations. Then while one decoy mobile is beaconing 
for a base station, another station will be in contention free mode. This is an example of 
what the software will do for the Honeynet system. As stated earlier this thesis only goes 
into the hardware design. [32] 
4.5.4.4 Technical issues that have been fixed 
This thesis is designed to fix the flaws that other wireless Honeynet systems have. A 
group in Texas has designed a wireless Honeynet system that utilizes VMware. They use 
VMware to try and produce the traffic. This is also used to make an attacker believe that . 
there are multiple operating systems on their Honeynet system. Another research project that 
has been done is the Honeynet project. This is another group that has flaws within their 
system design. [32] 
The way to break these systems is easy. An attacker who knows what they are doing 
follows steps when attacking a system. The biggest step that an attacker will perform is 
investigation of the target. After investigating either one of the mentioned systems, an 
attacker will be able to see that the network is a decoy. An attacker that knows what they are 
doing will monitor the traffic between the mobiles device and the base stations. The systems 
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mentioned above do not have spoofed traffic. So they do not portray the process of 
mobiles devices communicating with the base. Knowing this information, the design 
within this thesis uses the same protocols has real networks. The mobiles stations are 
stationary but they will still give the picture of a real network. [32J 
One concern about Honeynet systems is attackers using the Honeynet to compromise 
other systems. Other systems are connected to real networks. This system is a complete 
stand-alone wireless network. The servers that are connected to the base stations are not 
connected to a network. Firewalls within the design are located between the base stations 
and the servers. This is to give the attacker the thought of a firewall in front of the wired 
network. The servers are completely stand-alone. This takes care of some issues. For 
example a network that this system is designed for would be a sensitive network. Knowing 
this, outbound traffic to base stations other then the Honeynet base stations will be 
disabled. This will make it more believable that the network is a real network for sensitive 
data. [32] 
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Figure 4.17 location block diagram 
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Figure 4.17 Honeynet position location block design redone by Sadhana Jackson 
Figure 4.17 is the block diagram for the Honeynet system. The diagram shows how 
the Honeynet system is constructed. The Honeynet base station will get a signal from a 
mobile device. The Honeynet station triggers the intrusion detection system. The intrusion 
detection system checks the database of known RF signatures and MAC addresses. If a 
known RF signature and MAC Address can not be found -in the database, it is then sent back 
to the intrusion detection system which red flags it for analysis. Then the intrusion detection 
system sends the signal to the position location. Then the position location will send the data 
to the GIS system. Then a known position will be determined. This is demonstrated in the 
diagram above. The next sections. will discuss the designs of the separate parts of the above 
system. 
4.5.4.5 Yntrusion Detection System . . , . 
This is the portion of the system that will monitor Probes, Association and 
Authentication request frames. The monitoring system will. also detect network sniffing 
programs. These programs exist at the data link layer. The monitoring system will also 
record all incoming IP packets; it will produce alerts for well-known attacks. The monitoring 
system will be the part that performs data capture, data control and data collection. 
Data Capture is the capturing of all of the attacker's activities. These activities are then 
analyzed to learn the tools and tactics used by attackers. The goal is to capture as much data 
as possible, without the attacker knowing their every action is captured. The goal is to 
capture data in layers. It cannot depend on a single layer for information. 
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The monitoring is connected to the Honeynet system. It is not part of the Honeynet 
system. The monitoring system will be the section that sets stations to track mode. This is 
how the position locating and tracking is done. 
4.5.4.4 Identification- Friend or Foe 
The system will have to tell friend from foe. This will be done in a couple of ways. 
The first is to use the Media Access Control (MAC) address. Each network interface card 
has its own MAC address. This is only one way of identifying friendly mobiles. The one 
problem with this method is MAC address cloning. This is the process of spoofing a known 
MAC address. The second method that the system will use to tell friend from foe is to look 
at the spectral characteristics of the network interface card. Each NIC gives off _its own RF 
signature. The circuits within devices give off a different RF signal. I~~nowing~ this allows 
the system to keep a record of all signals from the. authorized portable devices.. This is the 
second method that will be used to tell who is an authorized user of the system and who is 
not. [32] 
4.5.4.5 Position Location and. Tracking Design 
The wireless Honeynet is the second line of defense. This could also in some ways 
be considered the true first line of defense. The reason for this is it is not .simply designed to 
keep an attacker busy by supplying false data. Once a host is picked up by the wireless 
Honeynet system, in most instances the system will identify them has an attacker. It is also 
known that a friendly might come in the zone. This is when the system will use one of the 
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two methods discussed earlier. As stated earlier, the monitoring system will trigger the 
position system to track the attacker. [32][33] 
The above example shows the placement of the Honeynet base stations. The stations 
are placed in this manner, for two reasons. The system will use line of sight, to communicate 
between the base stations. By using this type of setup, an attacker will be fooled into 
believing that a real network is in use. The other reason is to enable use of the position 
location system. The position location works by reading the strength of the signal. This is 
then is relayed to the nearest Honeynet base stations. To get a more accurate position 
location, at least three base stations are needed. So by placing the Honeynet stations in this 
manner at least three stations will be able to get a reading of a signal. [32][33] 
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5. Conclusion 
The defense that was discussed in this paper is not based on new concepts. The 
Honeynet is a well-known technique that has been in use by many security professionals for 
.years. The idea of how the Honeynet system is used in this thesis is a new concept. The 
method involves using the concept of defense-in-depth. 
The inner layer of security is also not a new concept. The way that it is being used is 
just _has an added layer of security. The methods for the position tracing and location are 
methods that are currently used. This thesis utilizes multiple techniques to give a more robust 
system, allowing the system to overcome some of the issues that come with using a tracking 
and position location. 
The Zone of Interference is set up to stop many problems that are associated with . 
wireless networks. The first of these problems is intercepting wireless signals. Within the 
Zone the attackers will see what could be called radio blackness. The signals that they 
receive will be the jamming signals. The Zone will stop cell phones. from be tracked, while 
powered on, in the area that is being secured. The cell phone will. beacon while in the secure 
area. The signals from the base stations will not be able to be reached. This is another 
example of the near far problem that was discussed earlier. This is because the j a~mming 
signals are nearer to the attacking receivers. 
This thesis has discussed these methods and putting them all to use should in theory 
give a secure area for wireless connectivity. Using the concept of defense-in-depth gives 
many ways to slow down an attacker. The idea is that nothing is fool proof. The goal is to 
slow the attacker down, or make the attacker frustrated enough because of the added security 
to just give up. The only fool proof method for securing a network is to not have one. This 
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is true for both wireless and wired, but that is not an option. So the best thing to do is to try 
and. give the attacker many roadblocks to get them to not want to spend the time or money. 
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6. Future Work 
The future work section includes a few details that would make a better system. 
Future work is needed, first of all, within the secure area. Currently the system tracks all 
_mobile stations within the secure area. One upgrade of the system would be to put a wireless 
IDS system within the secure Zone. This IDS system would have attack patterns within a 
database. This would be a method to catch attackers right in the act. Then the system. would 
track and perform a position locate on the attacker. The system would also know what type 
of an attack is happening. So follow up work on a design of the wireless IDS would be 
needed. This would allow the _correct safety precautions to take place. 
The next part for future work deals with the Honeynet system. This thesis 
describes how to design and setup the hardware. The software for the system needs to be 
designed. The current method of doing the software described by this thesis is very simple in 
design. The goal is to design software that would be considered complicated and robust. 
Then the Honeynet will be able to perform many of the ideas of fooling the attacker that is 
described in this thesis. One of the biggest parts of the future work of the software involves 
putting misleading data within the packets that are being sent between the fake mobiles and 
the base stations. The software would need to have many other features that a real network 
would have. For example, sometimes a network might have a lot of packets being sent. At 
other times, very little network traffic takes place. If there is constant traffic, an attacker 
might realize that they are receiving spoofed data. The system would then require one mobile 
device in beacon mode and another in CF poll, with another station sending data. Another 
mobile would then be necessary to receive information from a base station. These are future 
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things that. need to be done with more advanced software. As stated earlier this thesis 
focuses on the hardware design. 
The jammer design that is being utilized for the Zone of Interference wipes out the 
whole frequency range. Future work might involve using an intelligent jammer. The design 
of the j arrlmer used by this thesis utilizes methods of fooling the incoming receivers but 
better methods are possible to create a more intelli-gent jammer. This would make it harder 
to determine if the signal is being jammed. This type of jamming would also help reduce the 
amount of power that is needed by the current design within this thesis. 
63 
Appendix-A IS-95 CDMA 
Code Division Multiple Access Channel Structure 
The channels in IS-95 are really channel pairs, the forward channel and the reverse 
channels. A channel pair constitutes a CDMA channel.. The forward channels carry voice 
and signaling messages from the base to the mobiles. The reverse channels carry the voice 
traffic and signaling messages .from mobile to the base. The coverage area, like in other 
cellular systems, is modeled by closely packed hexagonal cells. Each cell may have more 
than one CDMA channel separated by FDMA channels and each CDMA channel in IS-95 
supports a maximum of 64 users [47] 
Forward Channels 
The Pilot Channel is broadcast by base station all the times. The synchronization channel 
is used to synchronize the clocks of the various mobiles with the base station. A mobile 
synchronizes to the synchronization channel every time it powers up because high-precision 
timing is needed. [47] 
The base station uses paging channels to communicate .with the mobile device when it is 
not making or receiving a call. The mobile gets informed of its incoming- call through the 
paging channel. The base station sends the information about the channel assignment of the 
forward and reverse traffic channels to the mobile device through the paging channel. The 
Forward and Reverse traffic channels carrry the actual voice during a call. The digital voice 
64 
data in the. traffic channels is Time Division Multiplexed into signaling packets during the 
call. [56] 
There are a total of 64 forward channels ' (base to mobile) that allow 64 users to share the 
same spectrum of 1.23 MHz. The good cross correlation properties of Orthogonal Walsh 
codes keep these channels from interfering. Traffic channel "1" functions as a pilot channel 
for all mobiles and the 32nd channel functions as a s nchronization source. The a in y pg g 
channel accounts for a third forward channel. The forward traffic channels use the remaining 
61 channels to -carry traffic. [47] 
The pilot channel is an un-modulated carrier. It is spread by a factor of 64 using Walsh 
code 1 (of 64). In addition to this, each base station has a 15-bit PN code (PN short code) 
that is unique from its neighbors and keeps the pilot signals of neighboring base stations from 
interfering at the mobile. The synchronizing channel is a low bit rate channel carrying clock 
information. It is spread by a factor of 64 using the Walsh code 32 (of 64). It is also byte 
interleaved, symbol-repeated and scrambled using a 42-bit PN-long code. Paging channels 
are modulated in a similar way, except the bit rate of the paging channels are higher than the 
synchronization channel. [47] 
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Figure A.18 Modulation in Forward Traffic Channel [47] redone by l`+lnchole Taylor anc~ 
Sadhana Jackson : ,. . 
The variable rate coded symbols are repeated to give a constant bit rate of 19.2Kbps. 
The symbols are block-interleaved to prevent burst errors due to fast fading. The PN long 
code is used to scramble the data to randomize replicas resulting from symbol repetition. 
The power control bits are multiplexed and the resulting low bit rate data is spread by a 
factor of 64 using the Walsh code. The spread spectrum signal has a chip rate of 1.288Mcps. 
In-phase (I) and Quadrature-phase (Q) PN short codes are used to separate this spread- 
spectrum signal from the traffic due to neighboring cells. [47] 
The mobile uses access channels to communicate with the base station when not in a 
call. The signaling messages include registration at the power up, or idle handoffs. There 
are 32 access channels available for the mobile station in a cell. These channels share the 
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same spectral band; they are separated using the PN-long codes. The mobile knows the PN- 
long codes assigned to each of these channels. An access channel can be used by only one 
mobile at a time. [47] 
The reverse traffic channels are used to carry voice and signaling messages traffic 
from mobile to base. Reverse channels use the same spectral frequency as the access 
channels. These channels are separated by PN long codes to keep the users within a cell 
from interfering. The PN long codes are randomly allocated at the beginning of the call 
unlike the pre-assigned PN codes for the access channels. There can be a maximum of 61 
Forward channels and this limits the number of users in a CDMA channel. [47] 
The modulation of access channels and reverse traffic channels is very similar. The 
only difference is that access channels carry slightly different bit rate. The figure below 
shows the modulation of reverse traffic channels. 
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Appendix-B GSM 
In the GSM network, the base station subsystem (BSS) takes care of the radio 
resources. The BSS has the Base Transceiver Station (BTS), the actual RF transceiver, and 
the Base Station Controller (BSC), which is in charge of mobility management and signaling 
on the Air-interface between the mobile. The GSM air-interface uses a combination of two 
different multiplexing schemes: 1) TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) and 2) FDMA 
(Frequency Division Multiple Access). The spectrum is divided into 200 kHz channels and 
each channel is divided into 8 timeslots. Each of the 8 timeslot frames has duration of 4, 6 
ms. The GSM transmission frequencies are presented in the table B.3. [45] 
Table B. 3 Downlink Uplink [45) redone by Sadhana Jackson 
Downlink Uplink 
GSM analog 
GSM digital 
935-960 MHz 8900-915 MHz 
1710-1785MHz 1805-1880 MHz 
The timeslots are called physical channels. A physical channel is full duplex- and several 
logical channels are able to share it. GSM has several- different logical channel types. GSM 
system has control channels. When a mobile enters a network, it first looks for a beacon of 
the nearby Base station by scanning all channels. All base stations transmit their beacons at a 
fixed frequency and power level. The mobile finds the beacon by searching the frequency 
with the highest signal level for a timeslot with a sequence of "00000... " - a sine wave - 
which is transmitted on the Frequency Correction Channel (FCCH). FCCH is one logical 
channel in the physical channel called the Broadcast Control Channel (BCCH) and it is used 
for bit synchronization. BCCH is on the 0-timeslot of the beacon frequency. After the 
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mobile achieves bit synchronization, it finds the Synchronization Channel (SCH) from the 
BCCH physical channel. The mobile can then find the logical channel BCCH. The logical 
channel BCCH transmits important BTS information such as the frequency hopping 
sequences. [45] 
There are three downlink control channels FCCH, SCH and BCCH, along with three 
call control logical channels located in the physical channel BCCH. The Paging Channel 
(PCH) is used when the network wants to contact a mobile. The mobile monitors all PCH 
channels on the BCCH-frequency. When the mobile is turned on, the network knows where 
the mobile is. The location may consist of several cells. Then the mobile is paged in all cells 
in the area. The mobile recognizes the page through the use of an identity number in the 
paging sequence. When the mobile wants to request service from the network or replying to 
a page, it sends a service request on the Random Access Channel (RACH). The network 
replies to a request from a mobile on the Access Grant Channel (AGCH). Table B.4 presents 
logical control channels that are located on the physical BCCH channel. [45] 
Table B.4 GSM Control Channels [.45] redone by Sadhana Jackson 
Downlink 1. Frequency Correction Channel (FCCH) 
2. Synchronization Channel (SCH) 
3. Broadcast Control Channel (BCCH) 
4. Paging Channel (PCH) 
5. Access Grant Channel (AGCH) 
Uplink 6. Random access channel (RACH) 
69 
The mobile measures the Signal-to-Noise ratio of cells from BCCH. The location 
updates are. then performed according to these measurement results. The mobile keeps a list 
of the best BCCH frequencies according to the selection criteria used by the operator. In a 
multi-frequency cell, only one frequency is required to have the BCCH on its 0-timeslot. 
During a call, the mobile transmits and receives on its own Traffic Channel. a burst in only 
one of the eight timeslots. During the other timeslots, the mobile monitors the BCCH levels 
and. information on the neighboring cells. The GSM system uses slow Frequency Hopping 
(FH), meaning the frequency changes after each burst, or every 4.6 ms. [45] 
All physical channels, except the 0-timeslot of BCCH-channel can hop. A 6-bit Hopping 
.Sequence is transmitted on BCCH and both the mobile and BTS have a frequency list 
indicating to which frequencies and in which order to hop. The uplink hopping follows the 
downlink hopping with a fixed delay.. Power control is optional for the BTS, and BCCH 
must use a constant power level due to the specific measurements carried out by the mobiles. 
Power control is triggered by the field strength and reception quality measurements. If the 
measurement average from a~480 m~ period is not. within the limits, the output power in the 
other end of the connection is altered accordingly. The base controls the power of the 
mobile. The GSM maximum transmitting powers are presented in table B.S. [45] 
~o 
Table B.5 GSM dBm Max and Min [45J redone by Sadhana Jackson 
Max Min 
GSM 900 
Mobile 
BTS ~ 
39 dBm 
58 dBm 
5 dBm 
9 dBm 
DCS 1800 
Mobile 
BTS 
30 dBm 
46 dBm 
0 dBm 
17 dBm 
Jamming of the GSM System 
In GSM is frequency hopping is used for the reduction of fast fading caused by the 
movement of the mobile devices. The hopping sequence can use up to 64 different 
frequencies. Compared to military FH systems designed for avoiding eavesdropping and 
jamming GSM uses a very small number. The jammer is able listen to Broadcast Control 
Channel and derives the hopping sequence in advance. The speed of GSM hopping is just 
over 20~ hops per second. This can be followed by a follow-on jammer. GSM frequency 
hopping provides no real protection against jamming attacks because its jamming mazgin is 
so low, [45] 
The GSM system is designed to handle sudden drop-outs in Traffic Channel (TCH) 
connections. These drop-outs are normally caused by obstacles such as bridges, buildings, 
and tunnels. A connection can also be lost if the user detaches the mobile's power source 
while the mobile is connected to the base station. In jamming situations, call re- 
establishment is the method the network will use. This is to re-initiate the jammed Traffic 
Channel. When the connection is dropped, a timer initiates ticking in the Mobile service 
switching center (MSC). If a new connection has not been established when the timer has 
reached its maximum time (a system operator setting) the connection is completely lost. [45] 
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The GSM channel architecture shows that the downlink Control Channels (FCCH, 
SCH and BCCH) should be targeted. These channels are recognizable because they use a 
constant power output. By jamming the synchronization of the information, it is possible to 
prevent the mobile device from detecting a valid GSM network. The GSM system has a 
feature that makes jamming easier to an attacker. The system will give feedback to the 
jammer. The feedback is about the jamming efficiency. Increasing all of the power agile 
channels power levels. This is done when jamming is successful. [45] 
Jamming efficiency for the GSM 
In order to jam a GSM system, the needed jam to signal ratio is -5 dB. The jammer 
will concentrate on attacking the uplink. Because a majority of BTS units .are located in 
places with higher elevation, uplink jamming is a very good jamming method against GSMe. 
[45] 
The connections that are in progress can be halted by jamming the Traffic Channel. 
They use the connection and the Random Access Channels of all other cells in the area. This 
will prevent the system from re-initiating the connection by going through another base 
station. This jamming must be sustained until the network ends, the attempt, by the mobile 
to re-establish the connection. This says that the channels have to be jammed for a few 
seconds. This guarantees that the connection should be lost. [45] 
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Appendix-C IEEE 802.11b 
Table C.1 Key .Characteristics of 802.11 
Physical Layer Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS), Frequency Hopping 
Spread Spectrum (FHSS) 
Frequency Bands 2.4GHz (ISM band) and SGHz 
Hop rate 1 Mbps, 2Mbps, S.SMbps, 11 Mbps (11 b), 54Mbps { 11 a), 54Mbps (11 g) 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) RC4-based stream encryption algorithm for 
confidentiality, authentication and integrity. Limited key management 
Operating Range About 100 feet indoors to over 1500 feet outdoors 
Positive Aspects Ethernet speeds without wires; many different products From many 
different companies. Wireless client cards and access point costs are decreasing 
Negative Aspects Poor security in native mode; throughput decrease with distance 
and load. 
[39] 
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Table C.2 IEEE 802.11 channels with frequencies 
Channel Frequency (GHz) 
1 2.412 
2 2.417 
3 2.422 
4 2.427 
S 2.432 
6 2.437 
7 2.442 
~ 2.447 
9 2.452 
10 2.457 
11 2.462 
[39] 
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25 MHZ 25 MHZ 
2.400 
2.412 
Channel 1 
2.437 
Channel 6 
2.462 2.484 
Channel 11 
Figure C.2 Minimum Channel Spacing between center frequencies 802.;11 X39] 
Methods of Security for IEEE 802.11 
Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol (WEP) 
WEP is a security protocol used in wireless local area networks (WEANS) defined in the 
802.11 standard. WEP was envisioned to give the same level of security as local area 
networks (LAN). LANs are inherently more secure than WEANS because LANs are 
protected by their physical structure, having some or all part of the network inside a building 
that can be protected from unauthorized access. WEANS are implemented over radio waves. 
They do not have the same physical structure and aze more vulnerable to tampering. WEP 
provides security by encrypting data over radio waves, protecting the data during 
~s 
transmission. The WEP protocol attempts to focus on three areas of security of WLANS. 
One of the biggest areas involves protection of the confidentiality of data. The physical layer 
of wireless networks is large; the possibility of an unauthorized person intercepting data is 
much greater. Access control is the second azea. This is the process of protecting access to a 
wireless network. WEP includes a checksum field, to protect the data from being tampered 
with. [64] 
Encryption methods used by Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
WEP uses a secret key that is shared between the areas that are communicating, to 
protect the transmission of the frame of data being sent. This means that the same key is 
used to encrypt and decrypt the data. The plaintext goes. through two processes, one process 
encrypts, and the other process attempts to protect against changes in the data from 
unauthorized persons. [16][7][1)[19] 
WEP will first compute the integrity check vector (ICV) by doing a redundancy of the 
frame, and then it appends the vector to the original frame. The result is in the original data. 
The RC4 algorithm is used is used to encrypt ICV and the message. The RC4 uses a 40-bit 
secret key and a 24-bit initialization vector. Then an exclusive XOR operation is done to 
make to produce the cipher text. Then the cipher text gets sent through the radio 
transmission link. The diagram below shows an example of how the WEP encryption 
algorithm works. 
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C.20 WEP encryption algorithm diagram [6] 
WEP Decryption Methods 
In the decryption process the initialization vector gets used to key the session .used to 
generate the .key sequence to decrypt the incoming message. When the proper key gets put 
together with the cipher text, the original data is back along with the integrity check vector. 
The decryption is verified doing the integrity check algorithm on the recovered data and 
comparing it the output integrity check vector to the integrity check vector transmitted datz. 
If they are not equal it is an error. Then a message is sent saying that it could not be 
authenticated. [16)[7][1][19] 
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Figure C.21 WEP decryption algorithm diagram [6] 
Methods of Authentication for WEP 
The data gets encrypted and decrypted with the same key. Some access points douse 
WEP alone without using a shared key. authentication. When WEP is utilized in this way it is 
used~for.an encryption engine only. The method just described is implemented utilizing a 
type of authentication. There are two types of authentication used in the IEEE 802.1 lb. 
There are the Open systems authentication and the Shared key authentication. [16][7][19] 
Open Systems Authentication 
[9][7][19] 
Open systems authentication is the default authentication protocol authentication. 
Open systems authentication authenticates anyone who request authentication. It provides a 
NULL authentication process. This method of authentication is used when the administrator 
is not concerned with security. The method sends data in clear text. 
~s 
Shared key Authentication 
[16][7l[1][19l 
This method of authentication uses the response and challenge response with a shared 
secret key to give the authentication. To talk, the initiator sends an authentication request 
management frame. This says they wish to share to use the shared key. The receipt of the 
authentication request responds by sending an authentication. management frame containing 
the challenge to the initiator. The challenge is made by using the pseudo- random number 
generator (P12NG) with the shared secret and the random initialized vector (IV)^2. When the 
initiator receives the management frame, they copy the contents of the challenge into a new 
management frame. Then it gets encrypted with the secret key with the new IV that is 
selected by the initiator., Then the encrypted frame is sent to the responder. The responder 
decrypts the frame and verifies the CRC integrity check value is correct. Then.the challenge 
text is matched against the original data. ; If they do match authentication was successful. 
Below is a diagram of the action that takes place during this process. 
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Figure C.22 WEP Authentication Diagram [6] 
WEP can be used with 40-bit key and 24-bit IV. The shorter key length can be much 
easier to comprise, even if the attacker uses modest computing resources. A large key of 
128-bit keys would make some attacks near impossible. This is even if the attacker uses 
sophisticated computers. 
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MAC Address Filtering 
The Media Access Control address is a hardware address that identifies each node of 
a network. It is a 12 digit hexadecimal In IEEE 802 networks, the Data Link Control 
(DLC) layer of the OSI Reference Model is divided into two sub-layers: the Logical 
Link .Control (LLC) layer and the Media Access Control (MAC) layer. The MAC layer 
interfaces directly with the network media. 
The idea behind MAC address filtering is to limit access to the AP. This is done by 
creating a list of the MAC address of the wireless network interfaces cards of the users 
on the network. Mobile users whose wireless network interface cards do not match one 
from the list associated with the access point, will not be allowed to associate with the. 
AP. [66] 
Internet Protocol Address Filtering . ~~ ~ ~~ 
Access points allow a user to set up a form of security, which will reject IP address. 
This is done when a block of IP addresses are specified to work with the AP. If an IP address 
is not on the list of addresses associated with that AP, the access point will not let the mobile 
host associate to it. [66] 
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
This is the most known method of spread spectrum technology, it is also know called 
Pseudo-noise Spread spectrum (PNSS). This method is when the signal gets spread out at the 
base band. The spread signal is modulated. The modulation is apart from the spreading 
81 
operation. Once the. receiver gets the signal it performs operations on it. The operations are 
done to recover the data. [3] The process is shown in the diagram below. 
Information  
Signal 
Spreader 
Recovered 
Information  
Despreader 
Modulator 
Demodulator 
Direct-Sequence Spread-Spectrum (DSSS) 
Figure C.23 Block Diagram of a simple DSSS system [3] redone by Nichole Taylor 
Figure C.23 shows an arrow for the information going into the spreader. This is when 
the information is spread below the base line. Then the signal is modulated. Then the 
information is received and demodulated. From there the information is sent to the 
Despreader. Then the information is recovered. [3] 
Direct sequence is able to resist jamming and Interference. The processing gain (PG) 
is the ratio of the signal bandwidth to the message bandwidth. The process gain is the 
presence of Interference. 
In direct sequence systems the codes length is the same as the spreading factor giving 
the equation: 
(G)p(DS)=(N)ds Equation C.11 [3] 
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The spreading codes are designed so the chip amplitudes are independent. The period of the 
PN sequence has N time chips. (N)ds=2^n-1 equation C.12 Nis the number of stages in the 
code generator.[3] 
Pseudo-Random Noise (PN) Sequences 
The PN sequence used for DS-spreading is N symbols long. These symbols are 
called chips in the time domain and have only two amplitude values: ± 1. The PN sequence 
is multiplied by the base band data sequence to produce the BPSK modulation function that 
will be used to modulate the transmitter. [3] 
when properly chosen, the suite of PN sequences chosen for a given communication 
system design will have acceptably low cross-correlation values and thus allow the 
separation of all transmitted signals at the receiver correlator. The receiver correlator also 
spreads the jammer signal, thus turning it into equivalent noise and making it difficult to jam 
the intended signal. The spreading can also hide the signal in the ambient noise. [3] 
Frequency Hopping spread spectrum 
Frequency Hopping spread spectrum systems are usually used with M-ary Frequency 
Shift Keying (MFSK) [this is a common method but they can use any technique]. The digital 
binary data is input into an MFSK modulator. The output of the MFSK modulator is then put 
into an FH modulator. The FH modulator mixes the data signal with a carrier sinusoid, 
whose frequency is dependent upon the PN generator. The carrier frequency is hopped over 
the bandwidth. Then the signal is transmitted through a channel. 
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Transmitter 
Data 
[48~ 
MFSK 
modulator modulator 
Channel • Receiver 
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Interference 
PN 
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PN 
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MFSK 
demodulator 
Data 
-~ 
Figure C.24 Frequency Hopping spread spectrum Diagram [57] redone by 
Nichole Taylor and Sadhana Jackson 
The bandwidth of a FH system, over a number of frequency hops or chips, is equal to 
the bandwidth of the frequency hopper. For example, the FH modulator has a bandwidth of 
100 MHz, and then the bandwidth of the entire system is 100 MHz. The bandwidth of a 
single chip is equal to the bandwidth of the MFSK modulator. 
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Diversity 
Frequency Hopping spread spectrum systems feature robustness. A signal has the 
ability to overcome channel shortcomings. One method of surmounting the inadequacies of a 
channel is by diversity transmission. In FH/MFSK systems, diversity means the transmission 
of a single tone several times over several different carrier frequencies. By sending the same 
piece of data multiple times at different frequencies, the probability of successful reception 
increases. [48] 
Fast Hopping vs. Slow Hopping 
An FH system is divided into one of two classes —fast-frequency hopping (FFH) or 
slow-frequency hopping (SFH). FFH is systems in which the carrier frequency is hopped 
several times per modulation symbol. The chip size in a FFH system is the time duration.of 
the single frequency hop. SFH, are systems in which the carrier frequency remains 
unchanged for several of modulation symbols. The chip size of an SFH system is the time 
duration of a single modulation symbol. [48] 
Known Security Risks for IEEE 802.11b 
Denial of service (Jamming) 
Jamming is simply providing RF energy to block reception of the signals. Jamming 
takes advantage of the near-far-effect. "The example is according to a CNN special report". 
An example of this is when Iraq set up GPS jammer during Gulf war two. The GPS satellites 
would beam the data down to the GPS receivers and this is how the personal on the ground 
would get the GPS data. Iraq set up jammers to block these signals from being received. 
This was done because the signals that the jammer was sending were near the devices that 
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were trying to receive the signals. To over come this, military beamed the signals from the 
GPS satellites to drone that were flying around the Iraq skies. This made the signals strong 
enough to overcome the signals that the jammers the Iraqis were sending out. [32] 
Insertion Attacks 
Insertion attacks occur when crackers deploy unauthorized devices in an effort to be 
recognized by an existing network. For instance, a cracker could set up shop outside an 
access point, armed with a notebook computer or PDA and Wireless Network cards. 
Because of the required devices' portability, it's simple enough to accomplish these attacks 
while parked in a car outside a business or home. The access point may or may not be 
configured for password authentication. [28] 
Interception and Monitoring of Wireless Traffic 
The attacker needs to be within range of an access point (approximately 300 feet for 
802.1 lb) for this attach to work. All a wireless intruder needs is access to the network data 
stream. Second, access points transmit their signals in approximately a circular pattern, 
which means that the 802.1 lb signal almost always extends beyond the physical boundaries 
of the work area it is intended to cover. This signal can be intercepted outside buildings, or 
even through floors in buildings. [28] 
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Access Point Clone Traffic Interception 
The attacker fools a legitimate wireless client into connecting to the attacker's 
spoofed access point. This is done by placing an unauthorized access point with a stronger 
signal in close proximity to wireless clients. [28] 
3.6.5 Denial of Service (Flooding) 
Flooding attacks can be easily done to wireless networks. This is when legitimate 
traffic cannot reach the clients or the access point because illegitimate traffic. 
This creates a denial of service attack. The action that has just been described overwhelms 
the frequencies. An attacker with the proper equipment can easily flood the 2.4 GHz 
frequency band. It corrupts the signal until the wireless network ceases to function. Cordless 
phones, baby monitors and other devices that operate on the 2.4 GHz band can disrupt a 
wireless network because they use this same frequency band. [32] 
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Appendix-D Antenna Theory 
Directional antennas, such as the Yagi, are good for directing the radiation pattern of 
a radio transmitter to a given direction and area. A Yagi Consist of one element that is 
driven. The remainder of the elements is passive and is driven parasitically. The spacing of 
the elements is such that the phases of the driven element and that of the reradiated waves 
add properly off the end of the array. [61] 
Table D.6 Summary of typical characteristics of Yagi antennas 
Typical Half-Power Beamwidth: 50degX 50 deg 
Typical gain: 5 to 15 dB 
Bandwidth: 5% cr 1.05:1 
[61] 
Table D7 Frequency limit: ~ ~~ 
Lower: ~~ ~ ~ 50 MHZ 
Upper: 2 GHZ 
[61] 
Characteristics of a Yagi Antenna 
Figures D.25 2 dimensional Elevation radiation patterns of the YAGI Antenna 
D.26 2 dimensional azimuth radiation patterns of the YAGI Antenna 
Figure D.27 Azimuth radiation pattern of a typical 3-element Yagi antenna 
Figure D.28 Typical Yagi azimuth radiation patterns for different numbers of elements. 
Figure D.29 describes constant equal receive signal. The diagram shows how the signal 
radiates from a signal point. The method in this thesis then shows how the arrays will then 
combine and form an array. 
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Elevation 
D.25 Yagi Elevation [61] redone by Sadhana Jackson 
Azimuth 
X 
D.26 Yagi Azimuth [61] redone by Sadhana Jackson 
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Figure D.27 Looking straight down on a 3 Bearn Element [61] redone by Nichole 
Taylor 
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2 Element Beam 
3 Element Beam 
5 Element Beam 
Figure D.28 Yagi Radiation Pattern [61] redone by Nichole Taylor 
Single Point 
Radiator 
Figure D.29 Constant equal receive signal [32] redone by Nichole Taylor 
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Array Power Pattern equations 
P(r,8) P(r,9) P=array times array power pattern 
PA(r,9) =Array 
Positioning the array in a curve shape helps to maintain the maximum power 
throughout through out the bandwidth. This is known has frequency shadowing. This is how 
to setup the Yagi antennas around the secure area. The radiation patterns, from the array's 
that surround the Zone, will. over lap each other. This is to give maximum coverage, around 
the secure area [32] [40] 
Beam Power Pattern equation 
P(X, Y) = PTP(r,e) 
Multiplying the beam power pattern by the array pattern determines the total of the combined 
pattern. [32J 
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Appendix-E Position-Location Theory 
Theoretical approach to the Position location 
Using the electromagnetic field strength received by one or more base stations (access 
points); allows the system to calculate an estimate of the position of the unfriendly. For 
example, one base station could estimate where the unfriendly is located on a circle. A 
second base station would add another circle and a third would add a third circle. This way, 
one could pinpoint the location within a certain accuracy that you would estimate. 
There are several methods that can be used for this. In this system design, it calls for 
the use of various techniques. The reason for using various techniques is because of multi-
path issues will arrive from the many signals that will be within the securedarea. ~ Multi-path.. 
is explained in greater: detail in a section below. [33] - ~ ~ ~ ~~ .. ~ . 
Multi~Path 
Multi-path Interference causes of receive performance sue to phase difference 
between the direct signal and its reflection. The reflected signal can totally cancel the direct 
signal. The delay caused by multi-path shows up has ghost figures on a broadcast television 
image. The delay shows up as ghost on the screen, they will be somewhat physically offset 
from the intended picture. [65J 
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Graphical Information Systems database (GIS) 
A GIS is a computer system capable of assembling, storing, manipulating, and displaying 
geographically referenced information, data identified according to their locations. The 
locations on a simple system are plotted on an ~X and Y coordinate system. This will allow 
the tracking system will be connected to the tracking system. This will allow the system to 
track the attacker and locate using the GIS database. The GIS system has these key 
components. 
• A computer graphics program that is used to draw a map. 
• One or more external databases that aze linked to the objects shown on the map. This 
linkage permits changes entered into the.database to be immediately displayed on the 
map. and querying. of the database_ directly from the map. 
• A set of analysis tools that can be used to graphically interpret the externally stored 
data, for example, by showing objects or regions that meet certain criteria in different 
colors or shadings. [33][32] 
Time of Arrival (TOA) 
• A wireless transmits can use any handset (digital, analog, TDMA, CDMA) 
The wireless device's signal is received at various antenna sites. Since each antenna is 
usually different distance from the device, the signal arrives at a slightly different time. This 
technique requires signal timing information from at least three different antenna sites. 
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• The receivers, synchronized by a clock, sends the signal timing data on to the mobile 
switch, where the times are compared and computed to generate a latitude and 
longitude for the device. 
• The signals device and the latitude and longitude are then sent to the GIS system. 
• Maps are drawn with specified latitudes and longitudes that can place the device on 
the map at a given location [33][32] 
Key ideas of TOA 
• Propagation time 
• Delay between sender and receiver 
• One-way time synchronization 
• Accurate clocks 
• Synchronization with 2 signals having different velocity 
• Additional reference 
•Round-trip time 
• No synchronization 
[33][32] 
Figure E.30 is a diagram representing TOA 
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1 
~~' 
Figure E.30 Time of Arrival (TOA) Diagram 
[33] redone by Nichole Taylor 
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Direction of Arrival (DOA) 
Mobile 
Base station 
1 
Base station 
3 
Base station 2 
Figure E.31 Direction of Arrival Diagram [33] redone by Nichole Taylor 
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This is also known as angle of arrival. The mobile is somewhere on the line of direction, 
where the 2 or mobiles lines intersect. This is where the mobile is located. 
• A wireless transmits can use any handset (digital, analog, TD1V~[A, CDMA) 
• The wireless device's signal is received at various antenna sites. Each antenna site is 
also equipped with additional gear to detect the compass. direction from which the 
device's signal is arriving. 
• The receivers send the signal and compass data on to the mobile switch, where the 
.angles are compared. and computed to generate a latitude and longitude for the signal. 
• The devices signal and the. latitude and longitude are then sent to the GIS system and 
mapped. [33] 
Ranging 
Ranging is an active system. Ranging sends out a signal to or from a mobile and 
reflects the signal back. Ranging then measures the round trip time delay. This equals the 
distance. The long integration time allows good performance in a signal to noise 
environment. The one drawback to ranging is multi-path. Below is a diagram of how 
ranging works. [33] 
T2 
B1 
Figure E.32 ranging diagram [33] redone by Nichole Taylor 
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Equations, for ranging [33] 
Measured delay 
Tm=T1+T2+T3 Equation 4.4. 
Assumption 
T1=T3 Equation 4.5 
Propagation 
Tp= Tm-T2/2 = T1+T3/2 Equation 4.6 
Distance base —mobile is d=TpC Equation 4.7 
c = 3 * 10g m / s Speed of light Equation 4.8 
[33l 
-Position _location by strength of signal ~• 
This method is an idea from electromagnetic theory. It says that the transmitted 
power is how the position is a system is able to locate the mobile. This is a method works 
with at least two base stations. For better results, more base stations are needed. The base 
stations that are nearest to the source of the RF signal will receive the signal from the mobile 
.station. Then the received power is calculated. From this point the distance (d) is calculated. 
This gives the distance between the base station and the mobile. When using this with the 
GIS system, the position location method is a very powerful solution, to locating mobile 
stations. Below are the equations and the diagrams to further explain Position location from 
the RF signal. [33] 
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= PrGrGR Equation 4.9 [33] 
Receiving units'. measure received power, PR 
Estimate PT, GT, GR, Lambda 
Calculation of D 
D 
M ~—
This makes it possible to develop a scheme to tell where a mobile is located. 
Figure 28 [33] 
Below is a diagram of how the system works 
Zone of 
Uncertainty 
Figure E.33 strength of signal [33] redone by Nichole Taylor 
• Apply probabilities in the annular rings giving a 2-dimensional probability 
function. 
• Use maximum likelihood estimate. 
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